We spent our afternoon at
the hospital today, this time with an
ophthalmology check-up. Degenerative vision problems are one of the things which often attends Elijah's
primary diagnosis, so we keep an eye on things with an annual check-up. In addition, he has
a ptosis, which the doctors have been watching to make sure it isn't interfering with his vision.
The checkup today was a little inconclusive in some ways, and we're going back tomorrow for another exam with a more experienced ophthalmologist. But the ptosis has definitely started to interfere with the vision in Elijah's right eye, so it's looking like it will need to be surgically corrected. And it's possible that there has been some overall degeneration in his eyesight in the "good" eye as well. It sounds like glasses are in his future, at least to strengthen the right eye after the surgery, and possibly to help with vision in the left eye as well. Patching may also be ahead.
It's another bump in the road. Not major, but another reminder that our little one's body isn't typical. Another reminder that he may well continue to need a little higher than average medical attention, that he may need to treat his body with a little higher than average care, all his life long.
***
Stellan is back in the hospital again, and looking at another risky surgery. They're no longer talking about making it to 20 kg, they're talking about making it through the night.
His mom, Jennifer, writes, "[W]e simply want Stellan to
survive this ordeal. If he ends up . . . pacemaker dependent for life, at least he'll have
a life."
I've been in shoes that fit a lot like hers, just praying for life for my child.
***
I've been reading
Indiana Girl's post on
healthcare reform and the value of human life, with the classic quotation from
Peter Singer:
"Governments implicitly place a dollar value on a human life when they decide how much is to be spent on health care programs and how much on other public goods that are not directed toward saving lives. The task of health care bureaucrats is then to get the best value for the resources they have been allocated. . . . As a first take, we might say that the good achieved by health care is the number of lives saved. But that is too crude. The death of a teenager is a greater tragedy than the death of an 85-year-old, and this should be reflected in our priorities."
And it's reminded me of things I've been reading
here, and
here. I read with Stellan on my mind, and Elijah, and
Makily, and S, and D, and M, and all the other "special needs" kids we know. I think of my friend R, waiting for a heart transplant, whose whole life has been bounded by hospitalizations, surgeries, and medications, and my brother-in-law, who is blind, and my Uncle Ronnie, whose Downs Syndrome did not end his life in his teens, as the doctors had predicted, but who lived well into his fifties, who lived to see and rejoice over his great-nephews.
***
If you want to talk about the most bang for your buck, Elijah should probably have been allowed to suffocate quietly to death at birth. In the first six months of his life, his hospital bills alone were hundreds of thousands of dollars past the million-dollar mark (and there were also the ambulance bills, the durable medical equipment bills, the perscription formula, the wound-care supplies, the
enteral feeding supplies, and on and on). And his "quality" of life--though "normal" now--was arguable then. If we're talking about spending health care dollars most efficiently, my son probably shouldn't make the cut.
***
In his
Time article, Peter Singer writes:
Health care does more than save lives: it also reduces pain and suffering. How can we compare saving a person’s life with, say, making it possible for someone who was confined to bed to return to an active life? We can elicit people’s values on that too. One common method is to describe medical conditions to people — let’s say being a quadriplegic — and tell them that they can choose between 10 years in that condition or some smaller number of years without it. If most would prefer, say, 10 years as a quadriplegic to 4 years of nondisabled life, but would choose 6 years of nondisabled life over 10 with quadriplegia, but have difficulty deciding between 5 years of nondisabled life or 10 years with quadriplegia, then they are, in effect, assessing life with quadriplegia as half as good as nondisabled life. (These are hypothetical figures, chosen to keep the math simple, and not based on any actual surveys.) If that judgment represents a rough average across the population, we might conclude that restoring to nondisabled life two people who would otherwise be quadriplegics is equivalent in value to saving the life of one person, provided the life expectancies of all involved are similar. . . .
Some will object that this discriminates against people with disabilities. If we return to the hypothetical assumption that a year with quadriplegia is valued at only half as much as a year without it, then a treatment that extends the lives of people without disabilities will be seen as providing twice the value of one that extends, for a similar period, the lives of quadriplegics. That clashes with the idea that all human lives are of equal value. The problem, however, does not lie with the concept of the quality-adjusted life-year, but with the judgment that, if faced with 10 years as a quadriplegic, one would prefer a shorter lifespan without a disability. Disability advocates might argue that such judgments, made by people without disabilities, merely reflect the ignorance and prejudice of people without disabilities when they think about people with disabilities. We should, they will very reasonably say, ask quadriplegics themselves to evaluate life with quadriplegia. If we do that, and we find that quadriplegics would not give up even one year of life as a quadriplegic in order to have their disability cured, then the QALY method does not justify giving preference to procedures that extend the lives of people without disabilities over procedures that extend the lives of people with disabilities.
Who in the community of the disabled does not desperately want to see a cure for disabilities? Which of us parents of children with special medical needs has not agonized over the sufferings of our children, and wished that it was within our power to stop those sufferings? No one would argue, I think, that life is more comfortable or easier, that "quality" of life is better for the disabled than for the able-bodied.
But what of it? Mr. Singer introduces a false dichotomy: He supposes that because human beings (selfish beings that we are) would rather live a life free of pain, would rather live a life
not fraught with difficulty, that it would be better for people not to live at all if they have to live in pain or with difficulty.
It's easy enough to take six months of life away from a hypothetical quadruplegic.
***
Elijah has come through his trial by fire relatively unscathed, thus far. Of the half-dozen or more times when he could easily (and in some cases, ought to have) sustained brain damage, he didn't. His remaining disabilities don't add up to make him much different from other three-year-olds, at this point.
But that isn't what makes him important. If he had died, those times when, by rights, he should have, if he had been profoundly brain damaged, and was wheelchair bound, and we were looking at a lifetime of tube feedings and diaper changes, it wouldn't make him less worth caring for now.
Elijah is worth caring for because his is a human life created by God, because he's a little picture of a facet of who God is, and because God has said He loves him--birth defects, scars, and all.
***
Once you get away from that clear, deep line in the sand, into the murky waters of
utilitarianism who's to say which lives have the most value? Peter Singer? (He, whose grandparents were murdered in Hitler's concentration camps, really ought to know better.)
It's so easy to look at that hypothetical quadruplegic and say that her quality of life is so poor she really doesn't need to live another six months. What happens when the quadruplegic is your mother, or your sister, or your daughter--or yourself? And you want her to live, but the government agency doesn't think she's worth the money?
When government agencies are deciding who's worth spending health-care money on, they tend to want to kill people who want to live.
If, as Peter Singer argues, "Governments implicitly place a dollar value on a human life when they decide how much is to be spent on health care programs and how much on other public goods that are not directed toward saving lives," and "[t]he task of health care bureaucrats is then to get the best value for the resources they have been allocated. . . ." that is all the more reason to keep the government out of and away from health care as much as we possibly can.
People aren't a mass of hypotheticals. They're persons, individuals--like Elijah, God-created. They're not to be assigned a value through cost-benefit analysis.